微信付出接口存在XML漏洞

近日，网上爆出了微信付出官方SDK(软件工具开发包)存在紧张的漏洞，确认该漏洞影响JAVA版本的SDK，可导致商家服务器被入侵(绕过付出的结果)。

值得正视的是，一旦攻击者获得商家的关键安全密钥，就可以通过发送伪造信息来诳骗商家而无需付费购买任何东西，显明是微信付出的大漏洞！影响范围伟大，建议用到JAVA SDK的商户快速检查并修复。

假如你在使用付出营业回调关照中，存在以了局景有使用XML解析的情况，请务必检查是否对进行了提防。

场景1：付出成功关照;

场景2：退款成功关照;

场景3：委托代扣签约、解约、扣款关照;

场景4：车主解约关照;

注：APP付出SDK不受影响。

检查及修复建议

1.假如您的后台体系使用了官方sdk，请更新sdk到最新版本 sdk的链接:https://pay.weixin.qq8654/wiki/doc/api/jsapi.php?chapter=11_1

2.假如您是有体系提供商，请联系提供商进行核查和升级修复;

3.假如您是自研体系顾问，请联系技术部门按以下指引核查和修复：

XXE漏洞必要你在代码中进行响应的设置，不同语言设置的内容不同，下面提供了几种主流开发语言的设置指引：

【PHP】

libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);

【JAVA】

import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;

import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException; // catching unsupported features

...

DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();

String FEATURE = null;

try {

// This is the PRIMARY defense. If DTDs (doctypes) are disallowed, almost all XML entity attacks are prevented

// Xerces 2 only - https://xerces.apache0343/xerces2-j/features.html#disallow-doctype-decl

FEATURE = "https://apache0343/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, true);

// If you can't completely disable DTDs, then at least do the following:

// Xerces 1 - https://xerces.apache0343/xerces-j/features.html#external-general-entities

// Xerces 2 - https://xerces.apache0343/xerces2-j/features.html#external-general-entities

// JDK7+ - https://xml0343/sax/features/external-general-entities

FEATURE = "https://xml0343/sax/features/external-general-entities";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// Xerces 1 - https://xerces.apache0343/xerces-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities

// Xerces 2 - https://xerces.apache0343/xerces2-j/features.html#external-parameter-entities

// JDK7+ - https://xml0343/sax/features/external-parameter-entities

FEATURE = "https://xml0343/sax/features/external-parameter-entities";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// Disable external DTDs as well

FEATURE = "https://apache0343/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd";

dbf.setFeature(FEATURE, false);

// and these as well, per Timothy Morgan's 2014 paper: "XML Schema, DTD, and Entity Attacks"

dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);

dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);

// And, per Timothy Morgan: "If for some reason support for inline DOCTYPEs are a requirement, then

// ensure the entity settings are disabled (as shown above) and beware that SSRF attacks

// (https://cwe.mitre0343/data/definitions/918.html) and denial

// of service attacks (such as billion laughs or decompression bombs via "jar:") are a risk."

// remaining parser logic

...

} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {

// This should catch a failed setFeature feature

logger2412("ParserConfigurationException was thrown. The feature '" +

FEATURE + "' is probably not supported by your XML processor.");

...

}

catch (SAXException e) {

// On Apache, this should be thrown when disallowing DOCTYPE

logger.warning("A DOCTYPE was passed into the XML document");

...

}

catch (IOException e) {

// XXE that points to a file that doesn't exist

logger.error("IOException occurred, XXE may still possible: " + e.getMessage());

...

}

DocumentBuilder safebuilder = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();

【.Net】

XmlDocument doc= new XmlDocument();

doc.XmlResolver = null;

【Python】

from lxml import etree

xmlData = etree.parse(xmlSource,etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))

【c/c++(常用库为libxml2 libxerces-c)】

【libxml2】:

确保关闭配置选项：XML_PARSE_NOENT 和 XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD

2.9版本以上已修复xxe

【libxerces-c】：

假如用的是XercesDOMParser:

XercesDOMParser *parser = new XercesDOMParser;

parser->setCreateEntityReferenceNodes(false);

假如是用SAXParser:

SAXParser* parser = new SAXParser;

parser->setDisableDefaultEntityResolution(true);

假如是用SAX2XMLReader:

SAX2XMLReader* reader = XMLReaderFactory::createXMLReader();

parser->setFeature(XMLUni::fgXercesDisableDefaultEntityResolution, true);

附录：更多开源库/语言版本的修复建议可参考：

https://www.embd.cn/owasp0343/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#C.2FC.2B.2B